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TURNING TO THE STATES: WHY VOTING RIGHTS ADVOCATES
SHOULD BRING VOTER ID CHALLENGES TO STATE COURTS
AND HOW TO IDENTIFY A FRIENDLY FORUM
LESSONS FROM THE POST-CRAWFORD DECISIONS
Carolyn F. Rice*
INTRODUCTION: THE VOTER FRAUD MYTH
On January 6, hundreds of protesters stormed the United States Capitol
to protest election results they believed to be fraudulent.1 The insurrection
followed months of propaganda, fearmongering, and completely baseless
claims by the President and Republican legislators that “voter fraud” had
illegally swung the 2020 election.2 It had not. U.S. election officials publicly
stated that the 2020 election was “the most secure in American history,” and
“independent experts, governors, and state election officials from both
parties [said] there was no evidence of widespread fraud.”3 Even Attorney
General Barr—a Trump loyalist—concluded that the U.S. Department of
Justice “had seen no evidence” of voter fraud that could have impacted the
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Luke Mogelson, Among the Insurrectionists, NEW YORKER 2 (Jan. 15, 2021).
Id.; see also Hope Yen, Ali Swenson, & Amanda Seitz, AP FACT CHECK: Trump’s Claims of Vote
Rigging Are All Wrong, AP NEWS (Dec. 3, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-ap-factcheck-joe-biden-donald-trump-technology-49a24edd6d10888dbad61689c24b05a5 [https://perm
a.cc/R7YN-7QXJ] (explaining that President Trump baselessly clung “to false notions of voter
fraud” for months, even after his allegations “of massive voting fraud ha[d] been refuted by a variety
of judges, state election officials and an arm of his own administration’s Homeland Security
Department”).
Reuters Staff, Fact Check: Courts Have Dismissed Multiple Lawsuits of Alleged Electoral Fraud Presented by
Trump Campaign, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-courtselection/fact-check-courts-have-dismissed-multiple-lawsuits-of-alleged-electoral-fraud-presentedby-trump-campaign-idUSKBN2AF1G1 [https://perma.cc/F9QK-MVV3].
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election.4 And yet, the false narrative that voter fraud—not votes—
determined the election has persisted. In April 2021, sixty percent of
Republicans still believed that the 2020 election results were fraudulent.5
Voter fraud has never been significantly documented in the United
States.6 Instead, the insurrection was the culmination of a lie set in motion
more than a century ago in order to disenfranchise poor, elderly, disabled,
and minority voters.7 Efforts to restrict voting access in the name of
preventing “voter fraud” trace back to the late nineteenth century, when
Northern conservative reformers sought to weaken the power of white ethnic
and working class electorates. For these reformers, “the sight of large
numbers of poorly educated voters marching to the polls could only mean
widespread manipulation and corruption.”8 These reformers—and, later,
white supremacists in the Reconstruction South—insisted that strict voting
requirements were necessary to prevent voter fraud, and yet “the most
striking feature of the contemporary literature on fraud was the sparsity of
actual cases it cited.”9 Even the reformers “themselves admitted that many
of these requirements were wholly ineffective” against fraud.10 But
preventing fraud was not the point. Instead, advocates pushed for stricter
voting requirements because the measures “increased the individual voter’s
burden of participation and edged large numbers of marginal voters out of
the process,” thus “restoring control by strongly conservative interests.”11
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Yen, Swenson & Seitz, supra note 2.
Alison Durkee, More Than Half of Republicans Believe Voter Fraud Claims and Most Still Support Trump, Poll
Finds, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2021/04/05/morethan-half-of-republicans-believe-voter-fraud-claims-and-most-still-support-trump-pollfinds/?sh=befe7501b3ff [https://perma.cc/P8NC-E42H].
See Joel A. Heller, Fearing Fear Itself: Photo Identification Laws, Fear of Fraud, and the Fundamental Right to
Vote, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1887 (2009) (“Evidence of in-person voter fraud, the only type of
fraud that photo ID requirements would squarely address, is notoriously scant.”).
Aaron Blake, The Great Capitulation of Trump’s Voter Fraud Crusade, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/12/great-capitulation-trumps-voter-fraudcrusade/ [https://perma.cc/GA9X-VQUF] (“The 2020 election is a case study in how unproved
claims can be weaponized. For decades, former President Donald Trump’s party warned of
significant voter fraud while successfully pushing policies such as voter ID. . . . By 2020, when
Trump lost, it culminated in a huge portion of the electorate believing in a ‘stolen election’ theory
for which there is vanishingly little actual evidence.”); see also Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be
the Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
370, 382 (1991) (tracing the origin of voter fraud claims to conservative efforts to disenfranchise
poor, uneducated, and working class people).
Cunningham, supra note 7, at 382.
Id.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 385, 374.

April 2022]

TURNING TO THE STATES

543

Today, conservative lawmakers continue to push for increasingly
restrictive voter ID laws in the name of protecting elections from voter
fraud.12 It does not matter that evidence of in-person voter fraud (the only
kind of fraud that such laws could prevent) is “notoriously scant” because
deterring voter fraud is not the point.13 Instead, conservatives continue to
push for voter ID laws because “parties with an interest in deterring the types
of voters least likely to own a photo ID”—read, Democratic voters—“have
an interest in propagating fears of voter fraud.”14 The possibility of voter
fraud itself does not threaten our democracy; however, the events of January
6, 2021 demonstrate that the myth of voter fraud does, both by
disenfranchising large numbers of voters and by weakening the public’s faith
in our elections. Twenty-one states currently enforce strict voter ID
requirements,15 and conservative state legislatures are in the process of
restricting access to the polls even further in response to the Democratic
victories in 2020.16 It is more urgent than ever for voting rights advocates to
challenge voter ID laws in court.
I. THE NEED FOR A NEW FORUM
Since the Civil Rights era, voting rights advocates have overwhelmingly
preferred to bring their challenges in federal courts.17 This preference was
based, in part, on the perception that federal judges were less partisan and
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Heller, supra note 6, at 1888.
Id. at 1887.
Id. at 1889.
See Photo ID Laws by State, SPREAD THE VOTE, https://www.spreadthevote.org/voter-id-states
[https://perma.cc/XU4G-NUZQ] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (identifying states that demand
photo-ID in order to vote).
See Voting Laws Roundup: March 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-march-2021
[https://perma.cc/8NQP-BL3Y] (stating that in a backlash to the 2020 election victories, state
lawmakers have introduced 361 restrictive voting bills in forty-seven states as of March 24, 2021).
See Irving Joyner, Challenging Voting Rights and Political Participation in State Courts, 21 SCHOLAR 231,
249 (2019) (“[T]he tendency of litigators has been to bring voting rights challenges in federal courts”
because “more meaningful relief has been possible when civil rights claims are presented to federal
court judges than with state court judges.”).
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more committed to protecting individual liberties than their state
counterparts.18 Unfortunately, much has changed.19
The federal courts have experienced an unprecedented wave of judicial
appointments under the Trump Administration. Today, nearly one in four
appellate judges and one in seven district judges were appointed by President
Trump.20 This class is more white, more male, and significantly younger
than the Obama and Bush appointees.21 On matters of individual rights
protection, these appointees are “more conservative even by Republican
standards.”22 They are also significantly more partisan in their rulings than
their Republican predecessors, “openly engag[ing] in causes important to
Republicans.”23
This leaning is particularly strong when it comes to curtailing voting
rights.24 A recent study conducted by the group Take Back the Court
examined the Trump district and appellate appointees’ records on voting
rights and found “a partisan pattern in voting rights rulings” that resulted in
“anti-democracy decisions in 85 percent of the election-related cases they
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Id. at 249 (“Traditionally, federal courts have provided a more favorable forum due to . . . less
partisan judges.”); see also Steven Mulroy, How State Courts—Not Federal Judges—Could Protect Voting,
YAHOO (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/now/state-courts-not-federal-judges170355651.html [https://perma.cc/95CC-8TCT] (explaining that since the Civil Rights
movement, federal courts have enjoyed a reputation as “the guardians of voting rights, a refuge
from states’ discrimination”).
See Joyner, supra note 17, at 249 (arguing the perception that federal courts are friendlier forums to
voting rights challenges is “not necessarily as true today as it was in the past”); Mulroy, supra note
18 (“Now, voting rights cases in federal court face uncertainty.”).
Carrie Johnson, Trump’s Impact on Federal Courts: Judicial Nominees by the Numbers, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/05/747013608/trumps-impacton-federal-courts-judicial-nominees-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/2YWA-ULPB]
(“[Trump’s] administration has appointed nearly 1 in 4 of the nation’s federal appeals court judges
and 1 in 7 of its district court judges.”).
Id. (estimating that around seventy percent of Trump appointees are white men and are relatively
young and could remain on the bench for 30 or 40 years); Rebecca R. Ruiz, Robert Gebeloff, Steve
Eder & Ben Protess, A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-court-judges.html [https://perma.cc
/7XUN-WXCB] (noting that among Trump appointees, “[t]wo-thirds are white men, and as a
group, they are much younger than the Obama and Bush appointees.”).
Mulroy, supra note 18.
Rebecca R. Ruiz, Robert Gebeloff, Steve Eder & Ben Protess, A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the
Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trumpappeals-court-judges.html [https://perma.cc/3B96-6K68].
See Jim Rutenberg & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Federal Appeals Courts Emerge as Crucial for Trump in Voting Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/17/us/politics/federal-appealscourts-trump-voting.html [https://perma.cc/C8VS-XUXH] (noting that circuit courts are more
conservative since Trump took office, so the panels, on average, are going to be more conservative
in the way they adjudicate voting cases).
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heard.”25 The study concluded that “there is a systematic pattern of
Republican-appointed judges and justices tipping the scales in favor of the
GOP by making voting harder.”26
The Supreme Court has also undergone a significant conservative shift
with the appointments of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Neil Gorsuch, and
Justice Amy Coney Barrett.27 As federal courts at every level “are
increasingly populated by Trump judges who will not expand individual
rights through interpretations of the Federal Constitution,” it stands to
reason that federal courts will likely remain an unfavorable forum for voting
rights challenges for decades to come.28
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has clearly demonstrated over the last
two decades that it cannot be counted upon to protect voting rights.29 Three
particularly damaging decisions stand out. First, the Court’s 2006 decision
in Purcell v. Gonzalez established a doctrine that effectively prevents lower
federal courts from striking down unconstitutional voting measures “on the
eve of an election.”30 The Court reasoned that intervention by lower federal
courts, “especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion
and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls” that grows as the
election draws nearer.31 In practice, the Purcell doctrine has the ironic effect
of allowing appellate federal courts—by reversing or vacating lower courts’
decisions—to cause further changes to state voting laws even closer to the
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See Charlie Savage, G.O.P.-Appointed Judges Threaten Democracy, Liberals Seeking Court Expansion Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/us/politics/court-packingjudges.html [https://perma.cc/3Y3P-6KVD] (quoting Aaron Belkin, the director of Take Back the
Court, which commissioned the study of federal appellate judges’ rulings in voting disputes).
Neal Devins, State Constitutionalism in the Age of Party Polarization, 71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1129, 1130
(2019) (“[W]ith at least two Trump appointees—Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh—already on
the U.S. Supreme Court, there is every reason to think that the Court will restrict rights
protections.”).
Id.
See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (finding Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act unconstitutional and thus eliminating the protections afforded by that section); Crawford
v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (holding that Indiana’s photo voter ID law
was not excessively burdensome on the right to vote and was justified by the state’s interest in
preventing voter fraud); and Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 3–5 (2006) (finding that the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred in granting an injunction against Proposition 200, a law that
required photo ID for voter registration in Arizona, because the district court had not issued any
findings of fact, to which the Court of Appeals owed deference).
See Republican Nat’l Comm’n v. Democratic Nat’l Comm’n, 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (“This
Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election
rules on the eve of an election.”) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006))).
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5.
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election.32 For example, in Republican National Commission v. Democratic National
Commission, a Wisconsin district court enjoined a state law requiring absentee
ballots to be postmarked by election day, in light of the COVID-19
pandemic.33 Invoking the Purcell doctrine, the Supreme Court stayed the
district court’s injunction—thereby reinstating the voting law—one day before
the deadline to turn in the ballots.34 In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
argued, “If proximity to the election counseled hesitation when the District
Court acted . . . this Court’s intervention today—even closer to the
election—is all the more inappropriate.”35 The Court’s fears of creating
voter confusion, she wrote, “pale in comparison to the risk that tens of
thousands of voters will be disenfranchised” by the late decision.36 For this
reason, the Purcell doctrine has come to represent the Court’s propensity for
striking down district court orders that attempt to protect voting rights.37
The Supreme Court’s Crawford v. Marion County decision also betrayed its
hostility to the cause of voting rights. In that case, the Court held that
Indiana’s voter ID law (which imposed significant burdens on low-income,
minority, and elderly voters) was “not excessively burdensome”38 and
justified by the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud—a threat that had
never been documented in the state.39 This decision effectively gave states
permission to enact restrictive voter ID laws based upon the completely
hypothetical and undocumented threat of voter fraud.

32

33
34
35
36
37

38
39

See Republican Nat’l Comm’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1207 (explaining that the lower court’s action in
allowing absentee ballots mailed or postmarked after the election date to be counted is the type of
action the Purcell doctrine seeks to prevent).
Id.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1210–11.
Id. at 1211.
See Jim Rutenberg & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Federal Appeals Courts Emerge as Crucial for Trump in Voting Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020) (noting that there have been many election disputes this year in which
federal district judges sided with civil rights groups to deliver a voting rights victory, only to be
stayed by appellate courts who apply the notion that “federal courts should not render decisions
affecting state voting provisions too close to elections”). This article observes that this trend is
explained in part by a recent, unprecedented wave of ultra-conservative appellate judicial
appointees who are “sympathetic to . . . a campaign by Republicans to limit voting.” Id.
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008) (plurality opinion) (quoting Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)).
Id. at 194 (finding that Indiana has a valid state interest in preventing voter fraud, notwithstanding
the fact that “[t]he record contains no evidence of any such [in-person voting] fraud actually
occurring in Indiana at any time in its history”).
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Finally, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court struck down the
Section 4(b) coverage formula40 of the Voting Rights Act and, as a
consequence, rendered the Section 5 preclearance provision41 “effectively
inoperable.”42 In the lead opinion, Justice John Roberts argued that the
Section 4(b) formula could no longer be justified—and was therefore an
unconstitutional transgression of states’ “equal sovereignty”—because it was
based on forty-year-old data and “things have changed in the South.”43
Things had not changed in the South. Within hours of the decision, states
moved to enact voting measures that would significantly prevent minority,
elderly, and low-income voters from accessing the franchise.44
Taken together, these three decisions pose serious obstacles to voting
rights litigators. As a result of Shelby, voting rights litigators have witnessed a
proliferation of discriminatory laws that could not have been implemented
under Section 5 preclearance.45 The Crawford decision gave permission to
states to enact voter ID laws that impose substantial burdens on voters, all to
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The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/effects-shelby-county-v-holder
[https://perma.cc/XG75-ZHA5] (“The coverage formula determined which jurisdictions had to
‘preclear’ changes to their election rules with the federal government before implementing them,
based on their history of race-based voter discrimination.”).
See Ryan P. Haygood, Hurricane SCOTUS: The Hubris of Striking Our Democracy’s Discrimination Checkpoint
in Shelby County & the Resulting Thunderstorm Assault on Voting Rights, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S11,
S17–18 (2015) (explaining that the Section 5 preclearance provision required all jurisdictions under
the coverage formula “to obtain preclearance from the Department of Justice or a three-judge panel
of the District Court for the District of Columbia before enacting voting changes” and that
“[p]reclearance would be granted after it was demonstrated that voting changes . . . were not
discriminatory”).
The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 40 (explaining that the Shelby decision “rendered
the Section 5 preclearance system effectively inoperable”).
See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 540, 544, 554 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203–04 (2009)).
See The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 40 (“The effects [of the Shelby decision] were
immediate. Within 24 hours of the ruling, Texas announced that it would implement a strict photo
ID law. Two other states, Mississippi and Alabama, also began to enforce photo ID laws that had
previously been barred . . . .”); see also Haygood, supra note 41, at S35–47 (describing the efforts of
legislatures in North Carolina, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, Arkansas, and Alabama to
enact voter ID laws immediately following the Shelby decision).
See The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 40 (“The decision in Shelby County opened the
floodgates to laws restricting voting throughout the United States.”); Deuel Ross, Opinion, Voting
Rights Success? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/08/18/opinion/voting-rights-success-not-so-fast.html [https://perma.cc/2L7P-KE
CA] (explaining that the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund “has seen more voter
discrimination—not less—in the three years since [Shelby]” and that the eliminated provisions of
the Voting Rights Act “would have blocked [these] discriminatory state and local voting changes”).
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address a problem (systemic voter fraud) that has never been documented.46
Finally, even if district judges strike down an unconstitutional state voting
law, increasingly conservative appellate courts are likely to overturn those
decisions pursuant to the Purcell doctrine.47
The Supreme Court’s increasingly hostile voting rights jurisprudence
combined with the recent wave of conservative judicial appointees indicate
that federal courts may no longer offer the most favorable forum for voting
rights challenges. The time has come for voting rights advocates to consider
a new venue.
II. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM: WHY STATE COURTS OFFER A VALUABLE
ALTERNATIVE FORUM
In response to a similar conservative shift in the 1970’s, Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr. authored an extremely influential article advancing the theory
of “judicial federalism.”48 Justice Brennan chastised the Court for retreating
from the protection of individual rights, instead issuing “door-closing
decisions” that undermined civil rights in the name of “comity and
federalism.”49 Justice Brennan urged state courts to “step into the breach”
left by the federal judiciary. He wrote:
The very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a
clear call to state courts to step into the breach. With the federal locus of our
double protections weakened, our liberties cannot survive if the states betray
the trust the Court has put in them . . . with federal scrutiny diminished, state
courts must respond by increasing their own.50
46
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See Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO STATE L.J. 1, 15 (2016) [hereinafter
Douglas, State Judges] (“After Crawford, states, likely emboldened by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision, began enacting stricter voter ID laws, especially in states with conservative-led
legislatures.”); see also Democratic Party of Ga. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. 2011) (applying
Crawford analysis to hold that the state voter ID law does not impose a substantial burden on voting
rights and is justified by the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud); Milwaukee Branch of NAACP
v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262 (Wis. 2014) (same); League of Women Voters of Ind. v. Rokita, 929
N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 2010) (same); Gentges v. State Election Bd., 419 P.3d 224 (Okla. 2018) (same); see
also Debunking the Voter Fraud Myth, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/debunking-voter-fraud-myth
[https://perma.cc/H3HJ-7X5T] (surveying numerous nationwide studies, governmental
investigations, and federal and state court decisions all concluding that systemic voter fraud has
never been documented).
See Rutenberg & Ruiz, supra note 24 (noting “at least eight major election disputes” in which federal
appellate courts stayed district court decisions that “sided with civil rights groups and Democrats”).
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1977).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 503.
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Justice Brennan observed that state constitutions offer an independent
“font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those
required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”51 He urged
states to use their state constitutions to build upon this federal floor and
provide more robust civil rights protections, insisting that “state courts
cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the
federal Constitution.” Without the “independent protective force” of state
constitutional rights, “the full realization of our liberties cannot be
guaranteed.”52
Justice Brennan’s arguments apply with equal force today. Just as the
Supreme Court withdrew from the protection of individual liberties in the
1970s, the federal judiciary can no longer be counted upon to protect voting
rights. State courts are called, once again, to “step into the breach.”53
The case for judicial federalism is particularly strong in the context of
voting rights because the federal constitution clearly contemplates that the
states will fill in gaps left by the federal laws. For example, Article I, Section
2 of the federal constitution leaves to the states the task of determining
election rules and voter eligibility requirements.54 The provision suggests
that the Framers intended state governments to build upon the voting rules
(and protections) provided for by the federal constitution and federal
jurisprudence.55
There is also a particularly strong need for state courts to protect voting
rights because the federal constitution never explicitly grants a fundamental right
to vote.56 Although the U.S. Constitution mentions individual voting rights
seven times (in Article I, Section 2 and in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments)
none of those provisions actually guarantees a right to vote.57 Instead, the

51
52
53
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Id. at 491.
Id.
See Devins, supra note 27, at 1130 (“Today, perhaps more than ever before, state supreme courts
will have ample opportunity to be rights innovators.”).
See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 96 (2014)
[hereinafter Douglas, The Right to Vote] (“The U.S. Constitution does not provide the qualifications
for voters itself but instead delegates that responsibility to the states.”).
See id. at 95 (explaining that the U.S. Constitution merely provides “the “floor” of individual
rights”—including voting rights—while state constitutions “grant more robust rights”); and id. at
102 (explaining that states set out rules that govern voter registration, the availability of absentee
ballots and early voting, and measures to protect the integrity of elections).
Id. at 95 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution confers only ‘negative’ rights, or prohibitions on governmental
action, as opposed to specifically stated grants of individual liberties.”).
Id. at 95–96.
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U.S. Constitution “merely implies the right to vote through negative
language” and requires only that “once a state grants the right to vote, it
simply must do so on equal terms.”58 In stark contrast, “virtually every state
explicitly confers the right to vote to all state citizens in its state
constitutions.”59 In fact, forty-nine out of fifty state constitutions contain an
explicit guarantee of the right to vote, many of which are phrased in positive,
affirmative language.60 In this sense, “state protection for the right to vote is
. . . more robust than what is provided under federal law.”61
There are also strong policy arguments for looking to state courts to
provide stronger voting rights protections. First, state courts “have the
primary responsibility to interpret their state’s constitution”62—including the
parameters on the right to vote—and “have no more duty to follow a U.S.
Supreme Court decision than they do to follow a decision of a sister state
supreme court.”63 This is true even where the state “is construing similar,
even identical, language in their own constitutions”64 as that which appears
in the federal constitution. Therefore, a state supreme court is not obligated
to follow federal precedent on matters of voting protections and “is immune
from review by the U.S. Supreme Court.”65 Second, state supreme courts
already decide significantly more voting rights issues than do the federal
courts.66 Finally, advocacy in state courts is invaluable because a successful
voting rights challenge in one court may influence other state courts—and
eventually, federal courts—to follow suit.67 All in all, state courts’

58
59
60

61
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63
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Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 13.
Id.
Douglas, The Right to Vote, supra note 54, at 104–05 (“[S]tate constitutions go well beyond the U.S.
Constitution in discussing the right to vote. In fact, most state constitutions have a separate article
specifically dealing with elections and the franchise. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, these state
constitutional provisions explicitly grant the right to vote to all citizens . . . .”).
Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 13.
Joyner, supra note 17, at 250.
Jeffrey S. Sutton, Forward: The Enduring Salience of State Constitutional Law, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV.
791, 794 (2018).
Id.
Joyner, supra note 17, at 250.
Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 1–2 (describing state courts as “paramount in defining the
constitutional right to vote” whereas “federal courts have issued far fewer opinions on voter ID laws
than state courts have in the past decade”).
See Sutton, supra note 63 at 796 (“Allow a State or two to experiment in addressing a new problem,
to be the first responder in this area . . . after which other state courts (or state legislatures) can
decide whether to follow that path or mark a new one. After the evidence is in, the [federal] judge
can decide whether to nationalize the issue, to allow more time, or to leave the issue to the States.”);
Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 4 (“Many state court opinions rely on decisions from other
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considerable experience in construing voting rights issues and their license to
construe state constitutional provisions independently from federal precedent
suggest that state courts are well-equipped to “step into the breach.”
III. APPLYING JUDICIAL FEDERALISM TO VOTER ID LAW CHALLENGES
In Crawford v. Marion County, the Supreme Court determined that
Indiana’s photo voter ID requirement did not unconstitutionally burden the
right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution.68
For voting rights advocates, this decision yielded two major consequences.
First, the Crawford decision “emboldened” many states to enact stricter voter
ID laws.69 Second, the Crawford decision effectively “closed the door to a
federal constitutional challenge to voter ID laws . . . .”70 For these reasons,
voting rights advocates turned their attention to state courts, “challenging
these voter ID laws around the country under state constitutions.”71 The
results, thus far, have been “decidedly mixed,” with “some states upholding
their state’s voter ID law and others striking it down.”72
In the following analysis, I will compare the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Crawford to the analysis of four “pathbreaking” courts that struck down voter
ID laws pursuant to their state constitutions. In doing so, I will pay particular
attention to whether these courts generally “lockstep” with federal
jurisprudence or give independent meaning to their state constitutions. I will
also compare these “pathbreaking” courts (which struck down voter ID laws
post-Crawford) with “lockstepping” courts that upheld voter ID laws to
determine how factors such as partisanship leanings; party control over state
government; judicial retention methods; and risk of subsequent
constitutional amendment may predict a “friendly” state forum for future
voter ID challenges.

68

69
70
71
72

states, especially when considering similar issues. When a state court faces . . . a voter ID
requirement, it is going to consider the views of its sister states. Federal courts also look to state
jurisprudence.”).
See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008) (plurality opinion); id. at 204
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing petitioners failed to show the Indiana photo voter ID
unconstitutionally burdened their right to vote).
Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
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A. The “Door-Closing” Crawford Decision
In Crawford, the Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of
Indiana’s voter ID law, SEA 483.73 The law required all citizens voting in
person to present government-issued photo identification.74 The law
contained exceptions for voters who (1) live in a state-licensed facility, such
as a nursing home; (2) are indigent; or (3) have a religious objection to being
photographed.75 The law allowed voters without photo identification to file
a provisional ballot that would be counted as long as they brought a photo
identification to the circuit court clerk’s office within ten days.76 The state
also offered free photo identification cards to qualified voters.77 Immediately
following the law’s enactment in 2005, the Indiana Democratic Party and
the Marion County Democratic Central Committee filed complaints
alleging, among other claims, that the new law substantially burdened the
right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.78
The Supreme Court’s Crawford analysis was damaging to voter ID law
challenges for four major reasons. First, the Court held that the AndersonBurdick standard applies—“a lower level balancing test, which is more
deferential to a state’s role in regulating elections”79—in lieu of strict scrutiny
review, the standard more typically applied to laws that implicate
fundamental rights.80 Applying the Anderson-Burdick test, the Supreme Court
looked first to the state interests that purportedly justified SEA 483—namely,
preventing voter fraud.81
The second damaging piece of the Crawford analysis is the Court’s
recognition that voter fraud is a valid state interest for enacting restrictive
voter ID requirements—notwithstanding a complete lack of evidence that such fraud
exists. Even as Justice John Paul Stevens acknowledged that “the only kind
of voter fraud that SEA 483 addresses is in-person voter impersonation at
polling places” and “[t]he record contains no evidence of any such fraud
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See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202–04 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 185
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 186–87.
See Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 15 (explaining that “the Court did not apply strict scrutiny
review but instead employed a lower level balancing test, which is more deferential to a state’s role
in regulating elections”)
Id.
See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191. The Court also acknowledged the state’s interests in promoting voter
confidence and updating the state’s voter rolls.
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actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history,” he nonetheless held
that “the interest in orderly administration and accurate recordkeeping
provides a sufficient justification” for the law.82 In essence, the Court found
that preventing voter fraud—even where the state cannot demonstrate any
evidence that voter fraud has ever occurred—is a valid state interest weighty
enough to justify infringing the right to vote.
Next, Justice Stevens balanced the state’s interest in preventing voter
fraud against the alleged burden of the voter ID law on low-income, elderly,
and other voters who lack the required form of identification.83 Justice
Stevens held that requiring these voters to obtain the necessary ID was not a
substantial or severe burden on the right to vote because (1) the State offered
photo identification cards for free and (2) “the inconvenience of making a
trip to the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a
photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to
vote.”84
This conclusion—that gathering the required supporting documents
(many of which are not free), traveling to the necessary clerk’s office, and
obtaining an ID is not a substantial burden on the right to vote—is the third
damaging piece of the Crawford decision. As Justice David Souter argued in
his dissent, the burden imposed by the voter ID law was substantial. He
noted that “the burden of traveling to a more distant BMV office . . . is
probably serious for many of the individuals who lack photo identification,
[who] almost certainly will not own cars . . . and public transportation in
Indiana is fairly limited . . . .”85 He also observed that in order to obtain a
“free” Indiana photo ID, voters must present either “a birth certificate,
certificate of naturalization, U.S. veterans photo identification, U.S. military
photo identification, or a U.S. passport” and that “the two most common of
these documents come at a price: Indiana counties charge anywhere from $3
to $12 for a birth certificate . . . and the total fees for a passport, moreover,
are up to $100.”86 Voter IDs in Indiana were not free—“most voters must
pay at least one fee to get the ID necessary to cast a regular ballot.”87 The
costs that SEA 483 imposes on voters are significant and, according to Justice
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Id. at 194, 196.
Id. at 198, 199.
Id. at 198–200.
Id. at 213–14 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 215–16.
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Souter, “disproportionately heavy for, and thus disproportionately likely to
deter, the poor, the old, and the immobile.”88
Despite these facts, Justice Stevens held that there was not sufficient
evidence to show the magnitude of the burden that SEA 483 imposed on the
right to vote.89 For this reason, the Court held that “the precise interests
advanced by the State are therefore sufficient to defeat petitioners’ facial
challenges to SEA 483.”90 Herein lies the fourth, final absurdity of the
Court’s Crawford decision—the Court accepted the state’s completely
unsubstantiated arguments that the law is necessary to combat voter fraud,
while at the same time holding that the petitioner’s considerable evidence
documenting the costs that approximately 43,000 voters without an ID
would have to shoulder in order to vote was insufficiently precise to demonstrate
an injury.91 In doing so, the Court essentially gave states a “free pass” to
enact strict voting measures based on the totally undocumented threat of
voter fraud—while at the same imposing a significant evidentiary burden on
voting rights advocates to demonstrate a sufficient burden.92
IV. “PATHBREAKING” ARGUMENTS: RATIONALES ADOPTED TO STRIKE
DOWN VOTER ID LAWS
Notwithstanding the “door-closing” Crawford decision in 2008, four state
courts have since struck down voter ID laws as unconstitutional under their
state constitutions.93 No two decisions were the same—some state courts
interpreted their state constitutions to provide more broad voting rights

88
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Id. at 215–16.
See id. at 200–01 (plurality opinion):
[T]he evidence in the record does not provide us with the number of registered voters
without photo identification . . . . Further, the deposition evidence presented in the District
Court does not provide any concrete evidence of the burden imposed on voters who
currently lack photo identification . . . . [W]e do not know the magnitude of the impact
SEA 483 will have on indigent voters in Indiana.
Id. at 203 (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 202–04; see also id. at 220–211 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that “a fair reading of the
data supports the . . . finding that around 43,000 Indiana residents lack the needed identification,
and will bear the burdens the law imposes,” and that “empirical precision . . . has never been
demanded for raising a voting-rights claim.”).
See Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 15 (“In essence, the Court closed the door to a federal
constitutional challenge to voter ID laws unless the voter-plaintiffs have very strong evidence of how
the law, as applied, severely impedes particular people from voting.”).
See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No.
333 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014); Martin v. Kohls, 2014 Ark.
427, 444 S.W.3d 844 (2014); Holmes v. Moore, 840 S.E.2d 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020).
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protections;94 one relied heavily on federal precedent;95 and one even
“lockstepped” with Crawford to hold that voter ID laws do not violate equal
protection.96 These cases provide important lessons on the diverse means by
which voting rights advocates can seek to overturn voter ID laws in state
forums.
Missouri
In 2006—two years before the Crawford decision—the Missouri Supreme
Court became the first state high court to strike down a voter ID law in
Weinschenk v. State.97 That case concerned a state constitutional challenge to
SB 1014, a law that required particular forms of photo identification to vote
in-person.98 The new law prohibited registered voters “from voting if they
present only out-of-state picture identification, social security cards, utility
bills, school or work IDs, or other documents that [had] served as proper
identification” under the prior law.99 Instead, voters were required to present
a Missouri driver’s license, non-driver’s license, or U.S. passport—
identification that at least three to four percent of Missourians lacked.100
In a per curiam opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down the
voter ID law on state constitutional grounds.101 More specifically, the Court
held that the photo ID requirement “violate[d] Missouri’s equal protection
clause . . . and Missouri’s constitutional guarantee of the right of its qualified,
registered citizens to vote.”102 The Court was careful to distinguish these
constitutional provisions—and the heightened protections they offer to
voters—from their federal counterparts, writing (“These rights are at the core
of Missouri’s constitution and, hence, receive state constitutional protections
even more extensive than those provided by the Constitution.”)103 Accordingly,
the Court refused to apply the federal Anderson-Burdick balancing test (the
deferential standard later applied in Crawford) to ascertain the
constitutionality of the law, insisting that “here, the issue is constitutionality
under Missouri’s constitution, not under the United States Constitution.”104
Instead, the Court endeavored to apply a traditional equal protection
94
95
96
97
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99
100
101
102
103
104

Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 204; Martin, 444 S.W.3d at 852.
Holmes, 840 S.E.2d at 254.
Applewhite, 2014 WL 184988 at *24.
Weinschenk, 203 S.W. 3d at 201.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 205, 206.
Id. at 204.
Id. (citing to MO. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 & 25 and art. VIII, § 2).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 216.
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analysis—“to determine whether the statute . . . impinges upon a
fundamental right” and, if so, to apply strict scrutiny review.105
According to the Court, the express guarantee of the right to vote and
the free elections clause—both enshrined in the state constitution—
“establish with unmistakable clarity that the right to vote is fundamental to
Missouri citizens.”106 Again, the Missouri Supreme Court took special care
to identify the unique protections offered by the state constitution, explaining
that “the express constitutional protection of the right to vote differentiates
the Missouri constitution from its federal counterpart . . . [, as] the right to
vote in state elections is conferred under federal law only by implication, not
by express guarantee.”107
Upon establishing that the right to vote is “fundamental” under the state
constitution, the Court explained that the voter ID law posed a significant
burden on indigent and elderly voters.108 In particular, the Court noted that
every kind of voter ID cost money to obtain, yet “lack of funds or time to
undertake the sometimes laborious process of obtaining a proper photo ID”
did not exempt voters from the requirement.109 Applying strict scrutiny
review, the Court conceded that the state’s interest in deterring voter fraud
was “compelling,” but completely unsubstantiated by any evidence. The Court
wrote, “No evidence was presented that voter impersonation fraud exists to
any substantial degree in Missouri . . . . In fact, the evidence that was
presented indicates that voter impersonation is not a problem in Missouri.”110
“These facts,” the Court concluded, “compel the conclusion that the PhotoID requirement is not “necessary to accomplish a compelling state
interest.”111 The Court also dismissed the state’s argument that the photo ID
requirement was necessary to combat “perceptions of voter fraud,” stating
that “where the fundamental rights of Missouri citizens are at stake, more
than mere perception is required for their abridgement.”112 And so, the
Missouri Supreme Court struck down the voter ID law as a violation of the
state constitution.
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Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 211 (citing to MO. CONST. art. I, § 25 and art. VIII, § 2).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 213–15 (noting that citizens without photo IDs are generally ill-equipped to bear the costs of
obtaining them, and that elderly voters may struggle to navigate lengthy, complex bureaucratic
processes).
Id. at 206.
Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
Id. at 217 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 218.
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Ten years later, Republican state legislators sought to override the
Supreme Court’s decision by proposing a constitutional amendment that
would allow the legislature to enact voter ID legislation.113 In the ten years
that had passed, no incidences of in-person voter fraud occurred in Missouri.114
Democratic Governor Nixon vetoed the early House version of the law,
arguing that “[m]aking voting more difficult for qualified voters and
disenfranchising certain classes of people is wrong.”115 Nonetheless, the
Republican-dominated legislature overrode his veto, and Missouri voters
approved the ballot initiative by sixty-three percent.116 As a result, the state
constitution was amended to provide that a “person seeking to vote in person
in public elections may be required by general law to identify himself or
herself . . . and verify his or her qualifications as a citizen . . . by providing
election officials with a form of identification, which may include valid
government-issued photo identification.”117
Wielding their new constitutional authority, Republican legislators
immediately enacted section 115.427, which required voters to either (1)
present a photo ID at the polls; (2) present a non-photo ID and sign an
affidavit swearing (under penalty of perjury) that they were unable to obtain
identification; or (3) cast a provisional ballot, which is recorded as long as the
voter returns with a photo ID.118 In 2020, voting rights advocates challenged
the affidavit requirement on state constitutional grounds—a challenge that
made its way to the Missouri Supreme Court in Priorities USA v. State. 119
Much had changed between 2006 and 2020. With the election of
Governor Eric Greitens in 2016, the Missouri state government became a
Republican trifecta for the first time in eight years.120 The Missouri
Constitution—which the state supreme court had interpreted to prohibit
113

114
115
116

117
118
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120

Mark Joseph Stern, Missouri Supreme Court Kills a Catch-22 Voter ID Law, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2020, 5:39
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/01/missouri-supreme-court-catch-22-voter-idlaw.html [https://perma.cc/2EGL-C8GT].
Id.
Id.
See Missouri Voter ID Requirement, Constitutional Amendment 6 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Voter_ID_Requirement,_Constitutional_Amendment_6_(201
6) [https://perma.cc/J35Y-9UM9] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (emphasis added).
Priorities USA v. State, 591 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
Id. at 451–52 (citing to MO. CONST. art. I, § 25 and art. VIII, § 2).
See Missouri Elections, 2016, BALLOTOPEDIA https://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_elections,_2016
[https://perma.cc/EV33-AKQB] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (“Missouri elected Eric Greitens (R)
as governor in 2016” which “turned the state to a Republican trifecta”); Party Control of Missouri State
Government, BALLOTOPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Missouri_state_
government [https://perma.cc/39S2-E2DZ] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
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photo identification requirements in Weinschenk—now contained an
amendment that explicitly contemplated such a requirement. And, of course,
Crawford v. Merrion County—which upheld voter ID laws as constitutional
under the federal Equal Protection Clause—came down in 2008.121
Apparently, the Missouri Supreme Court was not fazed by these
developments. Citing to Weinschenk, the Court began its Priorities USA analysis
with the rule that the Missouri Constitution establishes a fundamental right
to vote, even where “some regulation of the voting process is necessary to
protect the right to vote itself.”122 Eschewing the Anderson-Burdick standard
applied by the Supreme Court in Crawford, the Court maintained that strict
scrutiny review would be appropriate if the voter ID law impinged on
Missourians’ fundamental right to vote.123 However, the court declined to
even analyze the burden posed by the law “because the [affidavit]
requirement does not satisfy even rational basis review.”124
The affidavit requirement asked voters to swear—under penalty of
perjury—that (1) the voter does not possess a form of ID to vote; (2) the voter
understands that she could receive a voter ID for free in order to vote; (3) the
voter acknowledges that she must present a personal ID in order to vote; and
(4) the voter acknowledges that knowingly providing false information is a
violation of the law that subjects her to possible criminal prosecution.125
Even the court could not make heads or tails of this requirement.126 On
the one hand, the language of the affidavit indicates that the voter must not
have any form of ID, and yet she must present a form of non-photo ID to
exercise the affidavit option.127 At the same time, the voter must swear that
she understands she cannot vote without a photo voter ID, even as she votes
without a photo voter ID (by exercising the affidavit option). According to
testimony from voters, the misleading affidavit requirement deterred voter
participation because voters did not want to risk exposing themselves to
criminal prosecution for signing a contradictory and confusing document.128
Election officials did not understand the requirement either, and mistakenly
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See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008).
Priorities USA, 591 S.W.3d at 452 (citing Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 212).
Id. at 459.
Id. (emphasis added)
Id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 455.
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turned away qualified voters in a 2017 election.129 Even as the Missouri court
acknowledged that the state “has an interest in combatting voter fraud,” it
held that “requiring individuals . . . to sign a contradictory, misleading
affidavit is not a reasonable means to accomplish that goal.”130 The court
declined to sever the offending option from the voter ID law because the
remaining two options required voters to present a photo ID without
exception. Notwithstanding the 2016 constitutional amendment, the
Missouri court cited to Weinschenk for the rule that “requiring individuals to present
photo identification is unconstitutional.”131
Pennsylvania
In 2012, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted Act 18, “one of the most
restrictive” voter ID laws in the country.132 The bill was pushed through by
Republican legislators who insisted that the law was necessary to prevent inperson voter fraud, notwithstanding a complete lack of evidence that any
such fraud had ever occurred in the Commonwealth.133 Democrats
protested the measure, pointing out that the photo ID requirement would
disenfranchise hundreds of thousands of likely Democratic voters–
particularly “the poor, the elderly, and the young.”134 In the months
following the law’s passage, state election officials released their findings that
about 9.2% of the state’s voters did not have a photo ID that would satisfy
the new law,135 a figure nine times higher than the Commonwealth’s initial
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Stern, supra note 113 (“If individuals trained in executing election law cannot decipher it, how could
a layperson possibly decode this Kafkaesque word salad—under penalty of perjury, no less?”)
Priorities USA, 591 S.W.3d. at 455.
Id. at 458–59 (citing to Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 219) (emphasis added) (explaining that voter ID
requirements constitute a substantial and unconstitutional burden on the right to vote because
“some individuals, due to their personal circumstances, experience hurdles when attempting to
obtain photo identification . . . . Obtaining photo identification requires appropriate
documentation, time, and the ability to navigate bureaucracies.”)
Press Release: Pennsylvania’s Voter ID Law Found Unconstitutional, ACLU (Jan. 17, 2014),
https://www.aclupa.org/en/press-releases/pennsylvanias-voter-id-law-found-unconstitutional
[https://perma.cc/4DBP-GXX2].
Update:
Judge
Rules
Voter
ID
Law
Unconstitutional,
PUB.
INT.
L.
CTR.,
https://www.pubintlaw.org/cases-and-projects/judge-rules-voter-id-law-unconstitutional/
[https://perma.cc/474B-YZM9] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
Bob Warner, Voter ID Law May Affect More Pennsylvanians Than Previously Estimated, PHILA. INQUIRER
(July 4, 2012), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/state/20120704_Voter_ID_law_
may_affect_more_Pennsylvanians_than_previously_estimated.html [https://perma.cc/X7CTYH34].
Id.
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estimates.136 In Philadelphia—a Democratic stronghold—“about eighteen
percent of voters . . . lack sufficient ID” to comply with the new law.137
House Republican leader Mike Turzai openly acknowledged the political
ramifications of the voter ID law at that summer’s Republican State
Committee event, boasting “voter ID—which is going to allow Governor
Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania—done!”138
Act 18 required in-person voters to present particular forms of photo
identification—namely, government-issued photo IDs or identification
issued by a Pennsylvania educational institution, an assisted living facility, or
the military.139 The legislature coupled this requirement with an affirmative
duty on the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) to
provide free non-driver IDs to registered electors, as well as a duty on the
legislature to effectively educate the public about the new voting
requirements.140 The Commonwealth did not fulfill either of these
obligations.141 Instead, PennDOT required all voters seeking a “free”
PennDOT ID to provide “a series of identifying records, including a birth
certificate with a raised seal, a social security card, and two proofs of
residency.”142 Recognizing that voters could not fulfill these requirements,
PennDOT delegated its authority to issue IDs to the Department of State
(“DOS”), which “was designed to provide liberal access under Section 2(b)
of the Voter ID Law where the PennDOT voting ID did not.”143 However,
the DOS ID presented its own challenges, requiring voters to make multiple
trips to remote bureaucratic offices (without drivers licenses or public
transportation) and jump through numerous administrative hoops to receive
the identification they needed.144
In July 2012, voting rights advocates filed a motion for preliminary
injunction on the basis that thousands of voters would be unable to obtain
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Update: The Truth Continues to Emerge About Pennsylvania’s Photo ID Law, PUB. INT. L. CTR.,
https://www.pubintlaw.org/cases-and-projects/the-truth-continues-to-emerge-aboutpennsylvanias-photo-id-law/ [https://perma.cc/2BAA-F4DF] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
Warner, supra note 134.
Id.
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 333 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan.
17, 2014).
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *11.
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the required photo ID prior to the 2012 election.145 Following a trial in the
Commonwealth Court, Judge Simpson denied petitioners’ request for an
injunction on the basis of “a predictive judgment that the Commonwealth’s
efforts to educate the voting public, coupled with the remedial efforts being
made to compensate for the constraints on the issuance of a PennDOT
identification card, [would] ultimately be sufficient” to prevent
disenfranchisement.146 Petitioners immediately appealed to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.147
In 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was rated the 24th most liberal
state supreme court in the United States, and its justices were generally
considered to have more liberal political views than their counterparts in the
Commonwealth court.148 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
decision was significantly more protective of voting rights. The high court
established that the right to vote is “fundamental” under the Pennsylvania
state constitution149 and held that if Act 18 impedes eligible, registered voters
from casting their vote, it is necessarily unconstitutional.150 The court
observed that Act 18 established “a policy of liberal access” to free voter IDs
for all, but that the Commonwealth had been unable to actually provide such
liberal access.151 Although agency officials “testified under oath that they
[were] in the process of implementing several remedial measures” to comply
with Act 18’s liberal access requirement, the court was “not satisfied with a
mere predictive judgment based primarily on the assurances of government
145
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Update: Petitioners File Pre-Trial Brief for Motion for Preliminary Injunction, PUB. INT. L. CTR.,
https://www.pubintlaw.org/cases-and-projects/petitioners-file-pre-trial-brief-for-motion-forpreliminary-injunction/ [https://perma.cc/E4T8-RNJ9] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 4 (2012) (“Applewhite II”) (describing the decision in
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, Pa. Cmwlth., No. 330 M.D. 2012, filed Aug. 15, 2012 (single judge)
(PI Opinion 2012)).
Update: Preliminary Injunction Denied, But Fight Continues, PUB. INT. L. CTR., at
https://www.pubintlaw.org/cases-and-projects/preliminary-injunction-denied-but-fightcontinues/ [https://perma.cc/7TR6-5C7Z] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
See Pennsylvania Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania_Supreme_
Court [https://perma.cc/3LXV-NB2H] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (explaining a 2012 study that
concluded the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was “the 24th most liberal court” among state supreme
courts).
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1 (2012) (“The Declaration of Rights set forth in the
Pennsylvania Constitution prescribes that elections must be free and equal and “no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.” (citing PA.
CONST. art. I., § 5)).
See id. at 4–6 (observing the voter ID law was “enforced in a manner that prevents qualified and
eligible electors from voting” and holding that "if a statute violates constitutional norms in the short
term, a facial challenge may be sustainable even though the statute might validly be enforced at
some time in the future”).
Id. at 3.
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officials . . . .”152
Instead, the court remanded the matter to the
Commonwealth Court to assess the actual availability of free voter IDs and
“whether the procedures being used for the deployment of the cards comport
with the requirement of liberal access . . . .”153 If the Commonwealth failed
to ensure liberal access by that time, or if the Commonwealth Court “is still
not convinced . . . . that there will be no voter disenfranchisement arising
out of the Commonwealth’s implementation of a voter identification
requirement,” then “that court is obliged to enter a preliminary injunction.”154
And so, Act 18 returned to the Commonwealth Court one last time in
2014.155 The court began by responding to the state supreme court’s
instruction—to determine whether the Commonwealth’s implementation of
DOS voter IDs and public education campaign fulfilled its duties to ensure
“liberal access” to the polls. On both counts, the court held, “respondents
neglected their statutory duties under the Voter ID Law, and fail to furnish
liberal access.”156 The court observed that the Department of State did not
even have the administrative authority to issue IDs under state law, and
further that the DOS ID solution “limits rather than liberalizes [voter]
access” by creating additional, unnecessary obstacles.157 For example, voters
must appear in person at a PennDOT Drivers Licensing Center (DLC) in
order to obtain a DOS ID.158 There are no such centers in nine Pennsylvania
counties. In nine other counties, DLCs are open only one day a week. 159 In
an additional thirteen counties, DLCs are only open two days per week,
which “leaves about half of Pennsylvania without DLCs for five days a week,
imposing a significant barrier to accessing the “free ID”—the only ID to
which voters are statutorily entitled.”160 Requiring voters “who lack
compliant photo ID, (and thus have no driver’s license), to get to a DLC that
may . . . be several miles away and unreachable by public transport is
untenable.”161 The Commonwealth’s DOS ID solution, therefore, did “not
comport with liberal access”—a prerequisite to constitutionality.162
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Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17,
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The Commonwealth Court could have stopped there—however, it
proceeded to strike down Act 18 as facially unconstitutional under Pennsylvania
law, holding that “[a]s a constitutional prerequisite, any voter ID law must
contain a mechanism for ensuring liberal access to compliant photo IDs so that the
requirement of photo ID does not disenfranchise valid voters.”163 “In other
words, a state cannot require (A) proof of identification . . . without also
mandating (B), the government provide the new proof of identification.”164
Notwithstanding any state interest in regulating elections, the court held, the
Pennsylvania constitution “does not permit regulation of the right to vote
when such regulation denies the franchise, or ‘makes it so difficult as to
amount to a denial.”165
Like the Missouri Supreme Court, the Commonwealth court began its
analysis with the rule that the right to vote is “fundamental” under the state
constitution.166 Because Act 18 undeniably infringed on voters’ access to the
franchise—and failed to provide a non-burdensome means of acquiring an
ID, as established—the court subjected the law to strict scrutiny review.167
(This test, it bears mentioning, imposes a significantly higher burden on the
state than does the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which the U.S. Supreme
Court applied in Crawford.) Under this standard of review, “the burden is on
the government to demonstrate that the law infringing upon a fundamental
right is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”168
First, the court assessed the state’s asserted interests in the voter ID law—
namely, preventing voter fraud and building public confidence in
elections.169 In stark contrast to Crawford, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
court rejected the state’s alleged interest in preventing voter fraud, arguing
instead that “there were no specific incidents of voter fraud underlying the
passage of the Voter ID law . . .” and “a vague concern about voter fraud
does not rise to a level that justifies the burdens constructed here.” On this
basis, the Court held that unsubstantiated concerns about in-person voter
fraud are not a compelling interest under the Pennsylvania constitution.
Second, the court determined that the voter ID law was not narrowly
tailored to prevent voter fraud because prior elections without the voter ID
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id. at *18.
Id.
Id. at *19 (citing to Winston v. Moore, 244 Pa. 447, 457 (1914)).
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *19 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Jan. 17, 2014) (“In Pennsylvania, the right of qualified electors to vote is a fundamental one.”)
Id. at *20 (citing Petition of Berg, 712 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)).
Id.
Id.
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requirement had not been influenced by voter fraud, undermining the need
for such a measure, and because the law imposed unnecessary burdens on
voters’ fundamental rights.170 The voter ID law’s provisions for absentee or
provisional ballots did not correct the constitutional violation.171
In the end, Act 18 was struck down as facially unconstitutional pursuant
to state precedent and the Commonwealth court’s independent
interpretation of the state constitution. However, the court’s opinion
contains one final twist that merits close analysis—a reliance on Crawford to
deny Petitioners’ equal protection claims. Although this part of the opinion
did not impact the final outcome, the court’s decision to “lockstep” its
interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s equal protection clauses
with its federal counterpart in the U.S. Constitution offers an important
lesson. Citing to extensive state law precedent, the court explained that
“[e]qual protection under the Pennsylvania Constitution is coextensive with
the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution.”172 In other
words, the court was bound by state law to apply federal precedent to equal
protection challenges. Applying federal precedent, the court found that Act
18 is facially neutral, and “while the inherent statutory and constitutional
flaws” in the law “may have disproportionate impact on particular groups,
‘that impact must be traceable to purposeful discrimination in order to be
constitutionally valid.’”173 Citing to Crawford, incredibly, the Commonwealth
court held that because “federal case law applies as to an equal protection
claim . . . the distinction between voters who lack compliant photo ID and
those who have it commands only rational basis review, and does not violate
equal protection.”174 Notwithstanding the Pennsylvania courts’ commitment
to protecting the “fundamental” right to vote under its state constitution,
voting advocates must beware the risk that those same courts may “lockstep”
their interpretations of state equal protection provisions with federal
precedent—even if doing so undermines voter access.
Governor Corbett declined to appeal the decision.175

170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. at *21.
Id. at *23 (reasoning that absentee and provisional ballots can be challenged and rejected after the
fact).
Id. at *24.
Id. at *25 (citing Klesh v. Com., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 55 Pa. Cmwlth. 587, 423 A.2d 1348, 1351
(1980)).
Id. at *26.
Update: Governor Declines to Appeal Loss in PA Voter Fraud Lawsuit, PUB. INT. L. CTR.,
https://www.pubintlaw.org/cases-and-projects/governor-declines-to-appeal-loss-in-pa-voter-idlawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/6ZZW-XW76] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
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Arkansas
Also in 2014, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down Act 595—a voter
ID law—as facially unconstitutional under article III, section 1 of the
Arkansas Constitution.176 The law required voters to present photo
identification issued either by the U.S. government, the Arkansas
government, or an Arkansas postsecondary educational institution.177
Although the Republican-dominated legislature claimed that the law was
necessary to prevent voter fraud, Democratic Governor Beebe—who vetoed
the legislation—called it “an expensive solution in search of a problem” that
“would negatively impact one of our most precious rights as citizens.”178
Legislators overrode the veto, nonetheless.179 Voting rights advocates
immediately brought a challenge to the law on state constitutional grounds,
which found its way to the Arkansas Supreme Court—the ninth most liberal
state supreme court in the country180—six months later.181
The law was unconstitutional, the Court held, because it imposed an
additional qualification on the right to vote.182 Article III, section 1 of the
Arkansas Constitution provides that any person in the state may vote provided
that she is (1) a citizen of the United States; (2) an Arkansas resident; (3) at
least 18 years old; and (4) lawfully registered to vote.183 These four
qualifications, the court held, “simply do not include any proof-of-identity
requirement.”184 Relying on state supreme court precedent, the court held
that the requirements of article III must be interpreted “strictly,” and that to
allow the legislature to create additional qualifications would “declare that
part of the constitution . . . absolutely nugatory.”185 Instead, the court
176
177
178
179
180

181

182
183
184
185

Martin v. Kohls, 2014 Ark. 427, 444 S.W.3d 844, 846 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Arkansas Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas_Supreme_Court
[https://perma.cc/LJU7-AY8A] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (explaining that a 2012 political study
found the Arkansas Supreme Court was the ninth most liberal state supreme court in the United
States, based upon campaign contributions by the judges themselves, the partisan leanings of
contributors to the judges’ campaigns, and the ideology of the appointing body).
See List of Judges of the Arkansas Supreme Court, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/List_of_justices_of_the_Arkansas_Supreme_Court [https://perm a.cc/BV9F-6B35] (last
visited
Apr.
20,
2022);
see
also
Arkansas
Supreme
Court:
Political
Outlook,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas _Supreme_Court#Political_outlook [https://
perma.cc/34NS-CNL8] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (finding that the Arkansas Supreme Court is
“the 9th most liberal state court in the United States.”).
Kohls, 444 S.W.3d at 851–52.
See ARK. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Kohls, 444 S.W.3d at 852.
Id. at 851.
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“adhere[d] to the framer’s intent conferred in article [III], section 1 of the
Arkansas Constitution to require the foregoing four qualifications of voters
in an Arkansas election and nothing more.”186
In argument, the Arkansas government relied on Crawford for the
proposition that photo voter IDs are a “much-needed regulation[]” to
prevent voter fraud, and not an additional qualification.187 The Arkansas
Supreme Court rejected this argument because Crawford was decided under
the U.S. Constitution, and “here, we address the present issue solely under
the Arkansas Constitution.”188
Unfortunately for voting rights advocates, the Arkansas Constitution is
easily amended.189 Four years later, the Republican-dominated legislature
responded to the Kohls decision by proposing a new “Voter ID Amendment,”
that would add possession of a voter ID to the list of constitutional voting
qualifications.190 Voters approved the amendment by seventy-nine
percent.191 In the next voter ID challenge to come before the Arkansas
Supreme Court, the Court upheld the requirement on the basis that the
Arkansas Constitution had been amended to include voter ID as a voting
qualification.192
North Carolina
In 2020, voting rights advocates successfully petitioned the North
Carolina Court of Appeals to enjoin SB 824—the state’s voter ID law—on
the premise that it violated the Equal Protection Provision of the North
Carolina Constitution.193 This resulting decision is unique for five key
reasons.
First, SB 824 was enacted to give full effect to a constitutional amendment
enacted by ballot initiative two years earlier. The new constitutional
amendment provided that “voters offering to vote in person shall present
186
187
188
189

190
191
192

193

Id. at 852.
Id. at 853.
Id.
Amending State Constitutions: Arkansas, BALLOTPEDIA https://ballotpedia.org/Amending
_state_constitutions [https://perma.cc/S546-KFGK] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (explaining that
the Arkansas Constitution can be amended through multiple avenues, including legislatively
referred amendments; ballot initiatives, and in some cases, powers given to the General Assembly
to amend the constitution without voter approval).
See ARK. ISSUE 2, VOTER ID AMENDMENT 2018, supra note 183.
Id.
Martin v. Hass, 2018 Ark. 283, 556 S.W.509, 517 (upholding a voter ID requirement as a
qualification to vote because it is consistent with the policy and purpose of the voter ID
amendment).
Holmes v. Moore, 840 S.E.2d 244, 251 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020).
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photographic identification before voting [and] the General Assembly shall
enact general laws governing the requirements of such photographic
identification . . . .”194 SB 824 was intended to be one of those “general
laws.”195 Therefore, the North Carolina court actually struck down a voter
ID law that was specifically provided for by the state constitution itself.
Second, the petitioners’ claims against SB 824 are unique because they
allege that the law was enacted with racially discriminatory intent and
wielded a disparate impact on voters of color.196 In contrast, none of the
petitioners in Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Missouri, or Indiana could successfully
identify a discriminatory motive for the voter ID laws in question.197
Third, because petitioners’ voter ID claim was based on allegations of
racially discriminatory intent, a more favorable line of federal precedent
directly applied to their case—Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977).198 Under that precedent, the Court explained, “a
facially neutral law, like the one at issue here, can be motivated by invidious
racial discrimination” that is “just as abhorrent, and just as unconstitutional,
as laws that expressly discriminate on the basis of race.”199 The Arlington
Heights analysis directs courts to “undertake a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent” to determine whether
discriminatory purpose was “a motivating factor” for the law, considering
factors such as (1) the historical background of the law; (2) the sequence of
events leading to the law; (3) departures from the normal legislative
procedure; (4) the legislative history of the decision; and (4) whether the law
wields a disproportionate impact on one race over another.200
Fourth, the North Carolina Court of Appeals relied heavily upon a recent
favorable Fourth Circuit case201 that struck down an almost identical North
Carolina voter ID law—based on very similar circumstances and legislative
194
195

196
197
198

199
200
201

Id. at 250 (citing to N.C. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2(4), 3(2)).
Id. at 250-51. SB 824 does not differ significantly from the voter ID laws contested in Pennsylvania,
Missouri or Arkansas—it requires voters to present a particular form of photo identification,
provides for some exceptions based on religious objection or indigency, and promises to provide
voters with a form of ID “for free.”
Id. at 254-62 (analyzing petitioners’ claims that the North Carolina state legislature intentionally
enacted SB 824 to disenfranchise African American voters).
In contrast, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Arkansas did not consider claims that the law was enacted
with discriminatory intent.
Id. at 254 (holding that “the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp. and its progeny control the question of whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a
preliminary injunction based on their Discriminatory-Intent claim.”)
Id.
Id. at 254–55.
Id. at 255 (citing to N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016)).
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history– two years earlier. Citing frequently to the Fourth Circuit’s holdings
in McCrory (which also applied the Arlington Heights test), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals identified the following Arlington Heights factors—(1) North
Carolina has “a long history of race discrimination generally and race-based
vote suppression in particular”;202 (2) prior to the enactment of SB 824, the
North Carolina legislature compiled racial data on the types of voter IDs
commonly possessed by black voters;203 (3) SB 824 explicitly excluded “many
of the alternative photo IDs commonly possessed by African Americans”;204
(4) the North Carolina legislature engaged in a highly expedited, abridged
form of debate and legislative deliberation to pass SB 824 during a lame-duck
legislative session;205 and (5) “the burdens of obtaining a free ID are
significant . . . and fall disproportionately on voters of color.”206 Taken
together, the Court concluded, these Arlington Heights factors suggested that
the true motive lying behind SB 824 was racially discriminatory.207 Pursuant
to Arlington Heights precedent, the burden then shifted to the North Carolina
government to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the law.
Fifth, unlike every other state defendant in these voter ID cases, the North
Carolina government did not allege that the law was necessary to prevent or deter voter
fraud in the state. Instead, respondents alleged only that the law was
necessary “to fulfill our Constitution’s newly added mandate that North
Carolinians must present ID before voting.”208 The Court held that this
interest was not sufficient to justify the significant, disparate burden that the
law imposed on black voters and remanded the case to the lower court with
instructions to enjoin SB 824.209

202
203
204
205

206

207
208

209

Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 259 (noting “the legislature’s failure to consider public input, failure to use updated data,
failure to allow a thorough debate, and failure to take into account all implications of the bill’s
potential impacts on voters”)
Id. at 263 (quoting Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellant, Holmes v. Moore, 840 S.E.2d 244 (2020) (No.
COA-19-762); see also id. at 262 (“[T]his legislative history supports Plaintiffs’ claim of an underlying
motive of discriminatory intent in the enactment of S.B. 824.”).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265; see also id. (“[T]he General Assembly’s history with voter-ID laws, the legislative history
of the act, the unusual sequence of events leading to its passage, and the disproportional impact on
African American voters likely created by S.B. 824 all point to the same conclusion that
discriminatory intent remained a primary motivating factor behind S.B. 824, not the Amendment’s
directive to create a voter ID law.”).
Id. at 266-67.
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V. LESSONS FROM THE POST-CRAWFORD STATE COURT DECISIONS
Although all of these state courts considered very similar voter ID laws—
and applied state constitutional provisions with very similar language210—the
resulting analyses were “decidedly mixed.”211 In the sections that follow, I
discuss the lessons that voting rights litigators may draw from these state
court decisions.
A. “Friendly” state forums often—but do not necessarily—engage in independent
analysis of state constitutions.
Voting rights scholars hypothesize that “friendly” state courts invalidate
voter ID laws by independently analyzing the right to vote under the state
constitution, while “hostile” state courts uphold voter ID laws by analyzing
state constitutions in “lockstep” with federal precedent.212 Although they
represent a small sample size, the four “pathbreaking” state court decisions
described above refute this hypothesis. As discussed prior, three of the four
(Pennsylvania, Arkansas, and Missouri) struck down voter ID laws as
violative of the “fundamental right to vote” enshrined in their respective state
constitutions. Each of these decisions looked to the text of state constitutional
provisions and state precedent to find that the right to vote received greater
protections thereunder than under the federal constitution. Curiously,
however, the North Carolina court did not cite any particular provision in the
state constitution to strike down a voter ID law, instead relying entirely on
recent, relevant federal precedent.

210
211
212

See Appendix 1 for a complete chart of the state constitutional provisions.
Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 16.
See, e.g., id. at 15:
Underlying most decisions sustaining a voter ID law is a constricted interpretation of the
state-based constitutional right to vote that simply follows narrow federal jurisprudence.
By contrast, courts that have invalidated strict voter ID requirements often give
independent, broader force to the state constitution’s explicit conferral of the right to vote.
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This observation is also borne out by the state courts that upheld voter ID
laws post-Crawford—Indiana, 213 Tennessee,214 Georgia,215 Oklahoma216 and
Wisconsin.217 Two of these five state courts—Tennessee and Oklahoma—
relied entirely on independent analysis of state constitutional provisions—not
Crawford—to ultimately uphold voter ID laws.
In City of Memphis v. Hargett, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a photo
voter ID law because the Tennessee Constitution contained an “anti-voter
fraud” provision that explicitly empowered the legislature to enact such
laws.218 The court held “the same constitutional provisions that guarantee
the right to vote also charge the state with ensuring that elections are ‘free
and equal,’… and authorize the General Assembly ‘to enact . . . laws to
secure . . . the purity of the ballot box”—even in the absence of evidence that
voter fraud had occurred in the state.219 In response to Plaintiffs’ argument
that the voter ID requirement created an additional qualification on the right
to vote—which the Tennessee Constitution expressly prohibits220—the court
reasoned that requiring a voter ID “functions merely as an election
regulation to verify the voter’s identity” and was thus “more properly
classified as a regulation pertaining to an existing voting qualification.”221
Instead of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test applied in Crawford, the
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the law under strict scrutiny review,

213

214
215
216

217

218
219
220

221

See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 767, 772 (Ind. 2010). The
Indiana Supreme Court “lockstepped” with Crawford to hold that requiring voter IDs is not an
additional qualification to vote, but merely a “method of establishing a voter’s qualification to vote.”
Id. at 767 (quoting Crawford at 193).
See generally City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 2013) (upholding the state’s voter
ID law under strict scrutiny).
See generally Dem. Party of Ga. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. 2011) (upholding a voter ID law as a
reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction warranted by important state interests).
See generally Gentges v. State Election Bd., 419 P.3d 224, 228-229 (Okla. 2018) (holding that the
proper inquiry for whether a voter ID law is unconstitutional considers “whether the law was
designed to protect the purity of the ballot, not as a tool . . . to impair constitutional rights,” and,
after reviewing the legislative history, concluding that “the Voter ID law was intended . . . to
prevent future in-person voter fraud . . . [and not] with the intent to impair the right to vote.”).
See Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262 (Wis. 2014) (holding that Act 23
survives rational basis review under Crawford because it is justified by an interest in preventing voter
fraud and does not impose a severe burden on the right to vote).
Hargett at 103, 105 (citing to TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
Id. at 103; id. at 104 (“[W]hile in-person voter fraud may be rare . . . it is within the authority of the
General Assembly to guard against the risk of such fraud in this state . . . .”)
Id. at 108 (“[A]rticle IV, section I of the Tennessee Constitution enumerates several voting
qualifications,” including age, citizenship, residency and registration requirements, and “[t]here
shall be no other qualification attached to the right of suffrage”)
Id. at 109.
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finding that the law achieved the “compelling” interest of preventing voter
fraud without unduly burdening voter access.222
The Oklahoma Supreme Court applied a similar analysis when it upheld
a photo voter ID law in Gentges v. State Election Board. Like the Tennessee
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution contains an explicit anti-voting
fraud provision,223 which empowers the legislature to “enact such laws as
may be necessary to detect and punish fraud in such elections.”224 To
determine whether the voter ID passed constitutional muster, the Oklahoma
court asked whether the law “was designed to protect the purity of the ballot
[and was] not a tool or instrument to impair constitutional rights and
whether the measure “reflects a conscious legislative intent for electors to be
deprived of their right to vote.” The court acknowledged the complete
absence of evidence that any voter fraud had occurred in the state, and yet
affirmed that the law was intended to prevent voter fraud and not to
disenfranchise voters.225 Although the court referred to the Crawford decision
for the propositions that (1) actual evidence of voter fraud is not necessary to
justify voter ID laws and (2) photo voter IDs do not impose a severe burden
on the right to vote; the court applied a completely unique state constitutional
provision—and test—to ultimately uphold the law.226
Therefore, independent review of state constitutions does not necessarily
lead to a more favorable result— and “lockstepping” with federal precedent
does not necessarily doom a voting rights challenge.
B. Voting rights advocates should avoid bringing equal protection claims—or bring
additional claims—in courts that analyze state equal protection clauses in “lockstep”
with federal precedent.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ultimately struck down the
voter ID law for unconstitutionally burdening the fundamental right to vote,
which is guaranteed by article I, section 5 of the state’s constitution.227 At
the same time—and in a fascinating twist—the court held that the law did not
violate the equal protection guarantees of the state constitution under
Crawford.228 This is because Pennsylvania courts have long followed a general
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id. at 109, 114.
Gentges at 228.
Id. (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 4) (emphasis added).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230–31.
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 2014 WL 184988 at *18, *24 (2014) (citing to PA. CONST. art. I, §
5).
Id. at *24–26.
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rule of interpreting the state equal protection provisions in complete lockstep
with the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution. As previously
discussed, the Crawford decision established that voter ID laws do not
constitute a violation of equal protection under the federal constitution.
Therefore, it was predictable—and perhaps inevitable—that the
Commonwealth Court would rely on the Crawford decision to reject the
petitioners’ equal protection claims.
This rule was also borne out by the Georgia voter ID case, where voting
rights advocates argued that “the Georgia Constitution provides greater
protections under its equal protection clause than does the United States
Constitution, and, therefore, Georgians should enjoy enhanced equal
protection of their right to vote.”229 The Georgia Supreme Court dismissed
this argument, holding instead that “this Court has repeatedly stated that the
Georgia clause is generally ‘co-extensive’ with and ‘substantially equivalent’
to the federal equal protection clause, and that we apply them as one.”230
From there, the Georgia Supreme Court relied on Crawford to hold that the
voter ID law did not violate equal protection under the state constitution.231
These cases offer an important lesson for voting rights advocates.
Namely, advocates should pay attention to whether state courts interpret the
equal protection guarantees of their state constitutions in lockstep with
federal equal protection jurisprudence, and either avoid—or bring alternate
claims—in courts that do.232
C. Recognize the “pull” of recent federal precedent.
State supreme courts often follow federal jurisprudence—even as they
interpret their own state constitutions—because “they are subject to the
‘gravitational pull’ of federal norms.”233 In other words, state judges are

229
230
231

232

233

Dem. Party of Ga. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 74 (Ga. 2011) .
Id.
Id. at 75 (citing to Crawford and other federal cases for the proposition that preventing voter fraud is
an important state interest, that the voter ID requirement is not a significant burden, and that the
law at issue was actually less burdensome than the law upheld by the Supreme Court).
See also Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262 (Wis. 2014) (holding that a voter
ID law did not violate equal protection pursuant to Crawford); Dem. Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue
(same).
Devins, supra note 27, at 1133 (2019).
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likely to “lockstep” with federal precedent “because of the perceived
superiority of federal court interpretations.” 234
The North Carolina case illustrates how voting rights advocates might
utilize this principle in their favor. In that case, petitioners asserted claims
that the voter ID law (which closely resembled the voter ID laws upheld by
other states) was motivated by a racially discriminatory—and thus
unconstitutional—intent.235 Petitioners argued that the circumstances of the
case fit squarely with the federal Arlington Heights analysis, a favorable test that
allows voting rights advocates to introduce various circumstantial and direct
evidence that suggests racially discriminatory motives. The petitioners also
cited to the recent NAACP v. McCrory case—a Fourth Circuit decision that
applied the Arlington Heights factors to a virtually identical voter ID law that
had been enacted under almost identical (racially discriminatory)
circumstances.236 Clearly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found this
comparison persuasive, agreeing that the law was likely motivated by racially
discriminatory intent and ought to be enjoined.237 In this case, at least, the
existence of a recent, favorable federal decision in a virtually identical context
was an invaluable tool for striking down a voter ID law.
At the same time, relevant, recent federal precedent can obviously
undermine a voter ID challenge. The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in
League of Women Voters v. Rokita demonstrates this principle. In that case, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the very same voter ID law
that had been upheld as constitutional in Crawford v. Marion County. 238
Although the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged that “a federal court’s
interpretation of Indiana law is not binding on Indiana state courts,” the
court nonetheless relied heavily on the Crawford opinion to uphold the ID
law.239 From this case, one might conclude that a state supreme court is very
unlikely to strike down a voter ID law as unconstitutional under the state

234

235
236
237
238
239

Id. at 1144; see also id. (“Federal law is [seen as] prestigious, pervasive, and highly visible . . . . It is
no wonder then that state actors are drawn to it.”) (quoting Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of
Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 739 (2016)).
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Holmes v. Moore, 840 S.E.2d 244 (2020) (No. COA–19–762).
Id. at 9–14.
Holmes v. Moore, 840 S.E.2d, 244 at 265 (N.C. App. 2020).
League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758 at 761–62 (Ind. 2010).
Id. at 763. See also id. at 767 (citing to Crawford for the proposition that requiring voter IDs are not
an additional qualification to vote but instead an “effective method of establishing a voter’s
qualification to vote”); and 768–69 (citing to Crawford for the holding that the voter ID law “imposes
only a limited burden on voters’ rights” that are justified by state interests in modernizing elections
and preventing voter fraud) (internal citations omitted).
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constitution where a federal decision recently upheld a similar law. The
“pull,” unfortunately, is likely too great for a state supreme court to resist.
VI. CHOOSING A FRIENDLY FORUM: SHARED CHARACTERISTICS OF
STATE COURTS THAT STRIKE DOWN VOTER ID LAWS
Voting scholars have hypothesized that factors such as the risk of political
backlash, the risk of subsequent constitutional amendment, and judges’
partisan leanings may influence state courts’ receptiveness to voting rights
claims.240 In the following section, I analyze how these factors correlate with
the outcomes in the post-Crawford voter ID cases. By looking for trends
among the “friendly” and “hostile” state courts, I aim to offer a means of
predicting which state courts are likely to strike down voter ID laws in future
challenges.
A. Partisanship is a very strong indicator of whether a state court will uphold or
invalidate a voter ID law.
As the chart demonstrates below, almost every state court to strike down
a voter ID law post-Crawford leaned liberal. It bears noting that the only
“pathbreaking” court to stray from this pattern—the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court—had already been overturned once by the more
liberal Pennsylvania Supreme Court when it finally struck down Act 18.241 It
is possible, therefore, that the Commonwealth Court felt pressured to strike
down the rule in order to avoid yet another reversal.
At the same time, almost every state court to uphold a voter ID law postCrawford leaned conservative.
Chart 1: Voter ID Laws and Partisanship
State

240

241

Upheld/Struck Down Contemporary Political
Voter ID Law?
Ideology of the Judges

Devins, supra note 27, at 1135 (explaining that state court justices are more likely to “pathbreak” to
advance individual rights when they are more politically insulated and face less risk of backlash);
Douglas, State Judges, supra note 46, at 33 (“[A judge’s] ideology often correlates with the outcome
in a case, especially on highly partisan issues such as election law and voting rights.”).
See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan.
17, 2014) (discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s initial remand of the Applewhite case).
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Struck down

Slightly conservative-leaning242

Arkansas

Struck down

Liberal-leaning243

North Carolina

Struck down

Liberal-leaning244

Missouri

Struck down

Liberal-leaning245

Indiana

Upheld

Slightly liberal-leaning246

(Commonwealth Court)

(Court of
Appeals)

242

243

244

245

246

At the time of decision, the Commonwealth Court had a Republican majority. Compare Historical
List of Commonwealth Court Judges, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA., http://www.pacourts.us/learn/
history/historical-list-of-commonwealth-court-judges/ [https://perma.cc/J6NP-PTE7] (last
visited Apr. 20, 2022) (listing dates Commonwealth Court judges assumed office) with Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania_Commonwealth_Court [https://perma
.cc/8KED-8435] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (indicating Judge P. Kevin Brobson, Judge Anne
Covey, Judge Renée Cohn Jubelirer, Judge Mary Hannah Leavitt and Judge Patricia McCoullough
are Republicans and were on the Court at the time of the decision); see also Tom Infield, Voter ID
Case Puts Spotlight on Pa. Judge, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 13, 2012) https://www.inquirer.com
/philly/news/politics/20120813_Voter-ID_case_puts_spotlight_on_Pa__judge.html
[https://perma.cc/7NHS-D888] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (describing Judge Robert J. Simpson
as a Democrat-turned Republican); ASSOCIATED PRESS, Rendell’s High Court Pick Would Tip Balance
for D’s, PENN LIVE (Jun. 20, 2008) (identifying Judge Johnny J. Butler as a Republican).
See Supreme Court Justices, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://www.arcourts.gov/courts/supremecourt/justices [https://perma.cc/5XNM-L4EU] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) see also Arkansas Supreme
Court: Political Outlook, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas_Supreme_Court
[https://perma.cc/3A3W-93MX] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (finding that the Arkansas Supreme
Court was the ninth most liberal state supreme court in the United States).
See North Carolina Court of Appeals, WIKIPEDIA (June 7, 2020),
https://web.archive.org
/web/20200607125635/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Carolina_Court_of_Appeals
[https://perma.cc/8J9Q-7YHD] (showing that at the time of the decision, the Court of Appeals
had eight Democrats and seven Republicans).
See Missouri Supreme Court Elections, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/
Missouri_Supreme_Court_elections,_2020 [https://perma.cc/G23Y-RMB7] (last visited Apr. 20,
2022) (showing that at the time of the decision, four Democratic appointees and three Republican
appointees made up the Missouri Supreme Court); see also Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the
Right to Vote, 77 Ohio St. L. J. 1, 34 (2016) (explaining that “[m]ost of the Supreme Court judges in
the 6–1 majority that invalidated the state’s voter ID law had liberal backgrounds.”)
See Justices of the Indiana Supreme Court, STATE OF INDIANA,
https://www.in.gov/
courts/supreme/files/justice-bios.pdf [https://perma.cc/89HE-VYU4] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
(showing that at the time of the decision, the Indiana Supreme Court had three Democratic
appointees and two Republican appointees); see also Bonica and Woodruff Campaign Finance Scores of State
Supreme
Court
Justices, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Bonica_and_Woodruff_
campaign_finance_scores_of_state_supreme_court_justices,_2012 [https://perma.cc/QZV7SFSP] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (designating Indiana as a conservative-leaning Supreme Court
two years after the decision).
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Tennessee

Upheld

Liberal-leaning247

Georgia

Upheld

Conservative-leaning248

Oklahoma

Upheld

Conservative-leaning249

Wisconsin

Upheld

Conservative-leaning250

Clearly, voting rights is a highly partisan issue, and “a judge’s analysis of
the constitutional right to vote often correlates with his or her ideology.”251
However, it bears noting that political partisanship is an even stronger predictor
of outcome in voter ID cases than in other voting rights litigation.252 In fact,
“most (although not all) of the state judges ruling on voter ID laws in the past
decade have followed their ideological predilections.”253 In the majority of
voter ID cases, “[l]iberal judges most often construe the constitutional right
to vote broadly and therefore view voter ID laws skeptically, while
conservative judges tend to do the opposite.”254 For this reason, voting rights
advocates should try to discern—whether by campaign donations, partisan
elections, or gubernatorial appointments—the partisan leaning of a potential
state forum.

247
248

249

250

251
252
253
254

See Bonica and Woodruff Campaign Finance Scores of State Supreme Court Justices, 2012, supra note 246
(indicating that the Tennessee Supreme Court leans slightly liberal).
See
Georgia
Supreme
Court
Justice
Vacancy
(March
2020),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Georgia_Supreme_Court_justice_vacancy_(March_2020)
[https://perma.cc/UF4W-2CGY] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (explaining a study that examined
campaign contributions disclosed by Georgia justices; the partisan leanings of those contributors;
and the ideology of the appointing body to find that the Georgia Supreme Court generally leans
conservative).
See Bonica and Woodruff Campaign Finance Scores of State Supreme Court Justices, 2012, supra note 246
(identifying Oklahoma as the fourteenth most conservative state supreme court in the United
States).
See State Supreme Court Partisanship, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_
supreme_court_partisanship,_2016 [https://perma.cc/9CPQ-YKVZ] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
(identifying the Wisconsin Supreme Court as conservative leaning); Bonica and Woodruff Campaign
Finance Scores of State Supreme Court Justices, 2012, supra note 246 (identifying Wisconsin as the eleventh
most conservative state supreme court in the United States).
Douglas, supra note 46, at 33.
Id. (“The link between ideology and interpretation of the constitutional right to vote is most
poignant in decisions on voter ID laws.”).
Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
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B. “Friendly” state courts are highly likely to sit in divided governments, while “hostile”
state courts are likely to sit in Republican trifecta state governments.
As the chart demonstrates below, almost every state court to strike down a
voter ID law post-Crawford sat within a divided government, 255 and almost
every state court to uphold a voter ID law sat within a Republican trifecta state
government.256
Chart 2: Voter ID and Party Control Over State Government
State

Upheld or Struck
Down Voter ID
Law?

Divided Government/

Pennsylvania

Struck down

Republican trifecta257

Arkansas

Struck down

Divided government258

North Carolina

Struck down

Divided government259

Missouri

Struck down

Divided government260

Indiana

Upheld

Divided government261

Tennessee

Upheld

Republican trifecta262

255

256

257
258

259

260

261
262

Republican Trifecta

The only exception to this rule—Pennsylvania—became a divided government in the following
year with the election of Governor Tom Wolf. See Party Control of Pennsylvania State Government,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Pennsylvania_state_government
[https://perma.cc/79HV-MGT8] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (showing that Pennsylvania became
a divided government in 2015 with the election of Democratic Governor Tom Wolf).
The lone exception in this category—Indiana—became a Republican trifecta the following year.
See Party Control of Indiana State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control
_of_Indiana_state_government [https://perma.cc/6XHU-UWYH] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
(showing that Indiana became a Republican trifecta in 2011 after the party gained control of the
House of Representatives).
See Party Control of Pennsylvania State Government, supra note 255 (showing a Republican trifecta in 2014).
See Party Control of Arkansas State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of
_Arkansas_state_government [https://perma.cc/WJ6J-MQ9A] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
(showing a divided government in 2014).
See
Party
Control
of
North
Carolina
State
Government,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_North_Carolina_state_government [https://perma.cc/
6FH3-LQWB] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (showing a divided government in 2020).
See Party Control of Missouri State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_
of_Missouri_state_government [https://perma.cc/2EFN-MPYQ] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
(showing a divided government in 2014).
See Party Control of Indiana State Government, supra note 256 (showing a divided government in 2010).
See Party Control of Tennessee State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_
of_Tennessee_state_government [https://perma.cc/6F H3-LQWB] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
(showing a Republican trifecta in 2013).
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Georgia

Upheld

Republican trifecta263

Oklahoma

Upheld

Republican trifecta264

Wisconsin

Upheld

Republican trifecta265
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This correlation is intuitive because state court judges serving in
Republican-controlled state governments are “likely to come from the
dominant political party and likely to agree with the political
establishment.”266 For this reason, state courts sitting in Republican trifectas
are unlikely to “slap down the dominant party” by invalidating voter ID
laws.267 At the same time, state courts sitting in Democratic trifectas are also
unlikely to act as major players in voter ID litigation namely because
Democratic legislatures are less likely to enact such legislation in the first
place.268 Therefore, the only state governments in which voter ID challenges
are likely to succeed are in those states with governments that are either
currently divided or recently enough divided that the state court justices could
still harbor Democratic leanings.
C. State court judges facing contested reelections may feel more pressure to uphold a
politically-divisive voter ID law or follow federal precedent.
In general, state court justices are far more vulnerable to political
influence than federal judges because they do not enjoy life tenure and must
face regular reelections.269 For this reason, fear of political backlash (i.e.,
losing reelection) is a significant factor that may influence state judges’
decisions to follow federal precedent in politically divisive cases—especially

263

264

265

266
267
268

269

See Party Control of Georgia State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control
_of_Georgia_state_government [https://perma.cc/4MLX-EW5G] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
(showing a Republican trifecta in 2011).
See Party Control of Oklahoma State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_
control_of_Oklahoma_state_government [https://perma.cc/4MLX-EW5G] (last visited Apr. 20,
2022) (showing a Republican trifecta in 2018).
See Party Control of Wisconsin State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.
org/Party_control_of_Wisconsin_state_government [https://perma.cc/ H4YE-SHQP] (last
visited Apr. 20, 2022) (showing a Republican trifecta in 2014).
Devins, supra note 27, at 1147, 1162 (“[R]ed and blue state courts are likely to agree with red and
blue state legislatures.”).
Id. at 1164.
See id. (“[S]tate lawmakers [in Democratic states] are likely to enact and the governor likely to sign
rights-expanding legislation—so that state supreme courts will have fewer opportunities to fill the
void . . . .”).
See Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
455, 457, 462 (2010) (“In total, 89% of state supreme court justices face voters . . . .”).
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voter ID challenges.270 Voting scholars have hypothesized that the method of
judicial retention may impact the likelihood of a state court to “break paths”
from federal precedent.271 For example, a state judge facing a contested
reelection may be more likely to follow federal precedent for fear of political
backlash in the polls, whereas a judge facing a retention election (which
judges win ninety-nine percent of the time) is more likely to “take the lead in
extending rights” through expansive interpretations of the state
constitution.272 The chart below applies this hypothesis to the post-Crawford
voter ID decisions, illustrating three main findings:
Chart 3: Voter ID and Judicial Retention Method
State

Upheld or
Struck
Down
Voter

Judicial
Selection
Method

Risk of
Losing
Reelection
(Based on
Judicial
Selection
Method)

Were
justices
facing reelection at
time of
decision?

Struck
down

Partisan
election, then
retention
elections every
10 years.273

Low risk.

No.

Struck
down

Contested
non-partisan
election every
8 years.274

High risk.

No.

ID Law?

Pennsylvania
(Commonw.
Court)

Arkansas

270

271
272

273
274

See Devins, supra note 27, at 1134 (observing that the threat of losing reelection “make[s] state court
judges cautious when interpreting state law”); Devins & Mansker, supra note 269, at 477 (“[J]ustices
subject to some form of reelection are likely to be risk averse and, consequently, will steer clear of
issues that arguably run reelection risks.”).
Devins, supra note 27, at 1135 (“More than anything, judicial selection and retention influence state
justices.”).
Devins & Mansker, supra note 269, at 455, 477–78 (explaining that justices subject to contested
reelection “will steer clear of issues that arguably run reelection risks,” whereas “[j]ustices subject
to retention election (where justices win 99% of the time) will pay limited attention to public
opinion” and “take the lead in extending rights”).
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania_
Commonwealth_Court [https://perma.cc/6QTV-9AXC] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
Judicial Selection in Arkansas, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_Arkansas
[https://perma.cc/9ERB-29RB] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
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North
Carolina

Struck
down

Contested
partisan
election, then
run for
reelection
every eight
years.275

High risk.

Yes.

Missouri

Struck
down

Assisted
appointment,
then nonpartisan
retention
election one to
three years
into term, then
retention
election every
12 years.276

Low risk.

Yes.

Indiana

Upheld

Justices are
appointed by a
governor,
face nonpartisan
retention
election
during next
general
election and
again every ten
years.277

Low risk.

Yes.

Tennessee

Upheld

Governor
appoints
justices, then

Low risk.

Yes.

(Appeals)

275
276
277

(Only one
justice has

North Carolina Court of Appeals, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_
Court_of_Appeals [https://perma.cc/2MKX-D65S] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
Judicial Selection in Missouri, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_Missouri
[https://perma.cc/3PX2-KRXY] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
Judicial Selection in Indiana, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_Indiana
[https://perma.cc/RUC2-BB67] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
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Georgia

Oklahoma

278

279

280

281
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Upheld

Upheld

the justices
must win nonpartisan
retention
elections
every eight
years.278

ever lost a
retention
election in the
state.279)

Contested
non-partisan
elections
every six years.

Low risk.

Governor
appoints one
of three
nominees
identified by
legislature,
then judge is
subjected to
retention
elections every
six years.281

Low risk.

No.

(No sitting
Georgia
Supreme
Court justice
has ever lost
an election in
the 175-year
history of the
court.280)
Yes.

See
Judicial
Selection
in
Tennessee,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/
Judicial_selection_in_Tennessee [https://perma.cc/KGU9-SBXR] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022)
(detailing how justices are elected in Tennessee).
See Tennessee Supreme Court Elections 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Tennessee_Supreme_Court_elections,_2014 [https://perma.cc/D4N6-Q8AM] (last visited Apr.
20, 2022) (“[O]nly one Tennessee Supreme Court justice had ever been voted out of office during
a retention election—Justice Penny White . . . in 1996.”).
See Georgia Supreme Court Elections 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Georgia_Supreme_Court_elections,_2020 [https://perma.cc/6A44-69BY] (last visited Apr. 20,
2022) (detailing election results for Georgia Supreme Court Elections in 2020).
See Judicial Selection in Oklahoma, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/ Judicial
_selection_in_Oklahoma [https://perma.cc/AJ9V-QGP2] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (detailing
the judicial selection process in Oklahoma).
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Wisconsin

Upheld

Contested
nonpartisan
elections
every ten
years. 282

High risk.

No.

First, the majority of the “pathbreaking” court judges—those sitting in
Pennsylvania, Arkansas and Missouri—did not face a significant threat of
losing reelection when they struck down the voter ID laws. In each of these
states, judges either faced retention elections (which they were almost
guaranteed to win) or did not face reelection at all. Therefore, the postCrawford cases lend some support to the hypothesis that “pathbreaking” state
courts often face less risk of political backlash.
Second, the North Carolina Court of Appeals—the only “pathbreaking”
state where justices faced risky contested reelections—was also the only state
decision to rely completely on federal precedent to strike down a voter ID law. Even
as the North Carolina Court of Appeals “broke” with federal norms by
striking down a voter ID law as unconstitutional, it also chose to do so by
strictly adhering to federal precedent—a strategy that typically insulates state
courts from political backlash because of the perceived superiority of federal
norms. Although it is impossible to conclude how the risk of political
backlash may have influenced the court’s decision, the coincidence that these
judges relied exclusively upon federal precedent to strike down a politically
divisive law during an election year in which five justices faced contested elections
suggests that the fear of losing reelection may have played some part in their
ultimate decision-making. 283
The third point of interest lies with the Tennessee judicial election. As
noted, the Tennessee Supreme Court—a liberal-leaning court—voted
unanimously to uphold the state’s voter ID law in 2014. This chart suggests at
least a partial explanation for that decision—three justices were facing a
contentious reelection at the time of the decision. Those justices faced
retention elections (which typically pose little risk to justices) and only one
justice has ever failed to win a bid for reelection in the state’s history. Still,
282

283

See Wisconsin Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_Supreme_Court
[https://perma.cc/QW6T-CMCZ] (last accessed Feb. 2, 2022) (detailing the judicial selection
process for the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
See
North
Carolina
Court
of
Appeals:
Judicial
Selection,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_Court_of_Appeals#cite_note-system-4 (last accessed
Dec. 20, 2020) (explaining the judicial selection process for the North Carolina Appellate Courts).
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the justices faced an unusual threat in 2014—a highly partisan, extremely
well-funded campaign by Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsay to oust them
from the court for being “too liberal.”284 Although it is impossible to
determine exactly how this campaign—which publicly criticized the justices
“liberal record”— entered into the court’s final ruling, it is likely that the
unusual threat of losing reelection may have influenced the justices’
unanimous decision to uphold the voter ID law.
D. “Pathbreaking” courts are not deterred by the risk of subsequent constitutional
amendment—though voting rights advocates should still take notice.
Because state constitutions are “far easier to amend” than the federal
constitution, state courts that “break paths” with federal precedent face a
significant risk that a subsequent constitutional amendment—initiated either
by the legislature or citizen initiative—will effectively erase their decisions.285
State lawmakers can propose state constitutional amendments in all fifty
states, and twenty five states allow voters to “strike against state supreme
court decisions they dislike” via ballot initiatives.286 For this reason, some
voting rights scholars hypothesize that state courts are less likely to “break
paths” from federal precedent if their decisions are likely to be subsequently
nullified by a constitutional amendment. For example, scholars Neal Devins
and Nicole Mansker suggested that “Assuming that state supreme court
justices seek to maximize their legal policy preferences, the risk of
constitutional override is clearly something to take into account.”287
Accordingly, “justices might be more attentive to public opinion in states
with direct democracy initiatives than in states with hard-to-amend
constitutions.”288 However, the post-Crawford voter ID cases clearly refute
284

285
286

287

288

See Maya Srikrishnan, Conservatives Nationwide Target Tennessee Supreme Court Justices, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
6,
2014),
https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-tennessee-supreme-court20140805-story.html (describing an unprecedented mailing and media campaign by Lt. Governor
Ron Ramsay to oust three of the five state supreme court justices because they are “too liberal for
Tennessee.”).
Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455,
457-58 (2010) (“[S]tate constitutions are far easier to amend than the Federal Constitution . . . .”).
Devins, supra note 27, at 1137 (“Voters too can strike against state supreme court decisions they
dislike; twenty-five states allow for voters to amend their constitutions through initiatives. In all fifty
states, lawmakers can propose state constitutional amendments.”).
See Devins, supra note 27, at 1137 (explaining the author’s assumption that because state supreme
court justices seek to maximize their legal policy preferences, justices take into account risks of
constitutional override).
Devins & Mansker, supra note 269, at 471 (“[S]tate justices might take public opinion into account
if they thought there was a link between public opinion and the possible nullification of their
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this hypothesis, as illustrated by the chart below.
Chart 4: Voter ID and the Risk of Constitutional Amendment
State

Pennsylvani
a

Upheld or
Struck
Down
Voter ID
Law?

How to

Risk of

Amend the
Constitution

Const.
Amend.

Struck
down

To place a
legislatively referred
amendment on the
ballot, a majority
vote is required in 2
successive sessions of
the PA General
Assembly.289

Low

Struck
down

To place a
High
legislatively referred risk.
amendment on the
ballot, a majority
vote is required in
both chambers of the
state legislature.290

(Commw.
Court)

Arkansas

Has state
amended
the const.
to require
voter IDs?
No.

risk.

Yes.292

Citizens may
also initiate
amendments.291

289

290
291
292

decisions through constitutional amendments or, alternatively, perceived that elected officials
would be unwilling to implement a decision of which the public disapproves. For example, justices
might be more attentive to public opinion in states with direct democracy initiatives than in states
with hard-to-amend constitutions.”).
Legislatively Referred Constitutional Amendment, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Legislatively
_referred_constitutional_amendment [https://perma.cc/5XR9-MS7U] (last visited Apr. 20,
2022).
Id.
Initiated Constitutional Amendment, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Initiated_constitutional
_amendment [https://perma.cc/Y8AX-9YLM] (last accessed Feb. 2, 2022).
See ARKANSAS ISSUE 2, VOTER ID AMENDMENT (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Arkansas_Issue_2,_Voter_ID_Amendment_(2018) [https://perma.cc/ C4WL-JUYH] (last
accessed Feb. 2, 2022) (detailing Arkansas’ voter ID constitutional amendment passed in 2018).
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North
Carolina

Struck
down

To place a
legislatively referred
amendment on the
ballot, it must
receive a 60 percent
vote in each house
of the state
legislature.292

Struck
down

To place a
High
legislatively referred risk.
amendment on the
ballot, it must receive
a majority vote in
both chambers of
the MO state
legislature.294

(Appeals)

Missouri
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High

Yes.293

risk.

Yes.296

Citizens may
also initiate
amendments.295
Indiana

293
293

294
295
296

Upheld

To place a
legislatively referred
amendment on the
ballot, a majority
vote is required in
two successive
sessions of the

Low

No.

risk.

Legislatively Referred Constitutional Amendment, supra note 289.
See North Carolina Voter ID Amendment (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/North_
Carolina_Voter_ID_Amendment_(2018) [https://perma.cc/ 686H-UKWE] (last visited Apr. 20,
2022). The North Carolina legislature referred the measure to ballot, and North Carolina voters
approved the measure in the November 2018 election. The measure added language to section 2
(qualifications of a voter) and section 3 (voting in person) of article VI of the North Carolina
Constitution.
Id.
Initiated Constitutional Amendment, supra note 291.
See Missouri Voter ID Requirement, Constitutional Amendment 6 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Voter_ID_Requirement,_Constitutional_Amendment_6_
(2016) [https://perma.cc/THK5-78C4] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022). Voters approved this
amendment in November 2016 election, added a section 11 to art. VIII of Missouri Constitution.
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Indiana General
Assembly.297
Tennessee

Georgia

Oklahoma

Upheld

Upheld

Upheld

To place a
legislatively referred
amendment on the
ballot, the General
Assembly must
approve the
proposed
amendment by
majority vote in one
session, and then by
2/3 in a second
session.298

Low

To place a
legislatively referred
amendment on the
ballot, it must be
approved by a 2/3
vote in each
chamber of the
General
Assembly.299

High

To place a
legislatively referred
amendment on the
ballot, it must
receive a majority
vote in the state
legislature.300

High

Citizens may
also initiate
amendments.301

297
298
299
300
301

Legislatively Referred Constitutional Amendment, supra note 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Initiated Constitutional Amendment, supra note 291.

No.

risk.

No.

risk.

risk.

No.
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Upheld

To place a
legislatively referred
amendment on the
ballot, it must
receive a majority
vote in two
successive sessions of
the state
legislature.302

Low

No.

risk.

Three of the four “pathbreaking” state courts invalidated voter ID laws
notwithstanding the high risk of subsequent constitutional amendment. In
North Carolina and Missouri, as discussed prior, the state courts struck down
the voter ID provisions even after the state had amended its constitution to
allow for such voter ID laws, effectively rebutting the amendments. Clearly,
“pathbreaking” states do not fear subsequent reversal by constitutional
amendment. In fact, this pattern suggests that state courts may be more willing
to strike down a voter ID law when they know that their decision can still be
reversed by voters’ endorsement of a subsequent constitutional amendment.
CONCLUSION
The 2020 election was the highest turnout for a presidential election in
fifty years.303 In response, Republican state lawmakers across the country
“are moving swiftly” to enact legislation that will restrict voter access—
including voter ID laws.304 Their justification for these increasingly stringent
requirements, unsurprisingly, is “voter fraud.”305 The need to challenge
voter ID laws—and to start to form a consensus against their constitutionality
among several states—is more urgent than ever before.
As this analysis illustrates, the success of voting rights challenges in state
courts is often “mixed.” This has always been a critique of judicial
federalism. However, the fact remains that our federal judiciary is no longer
a friendly forum, and likely will not be for some time. Voting rights
302
303

304
305

Legislatively Referred Constitutional Amendment, supra note 291.
Anthony Izaguirre & Acacia Coronado, GOP Lawmakers Seek Tougher Voting Rules After Record Turnout,
AP NEWS (Jan. 31, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/bills-voting-rights-elections-coronaviruspandemic-voter-registration-0e94844d72d2a2bf8b51b1c950bd64fc
[https://perma.cc/P5QEPQAL].
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challenges cannot wait. Even if judicial federalism “fails to fulfill its promise
as an alternative to a progressive Supreme Court protecting individual rights
and liberties,” it still serves as a means to an end—here, protecting voting
rights in individual states, with the hope that sister state courts (and
eventually, a more progressive federal court) will someday take notice and
follow suit. 306

306

See Christine L. Nemacheck, The Path to Obergefell: Saying “I Do” to New Judicial Federalism?, 54 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 149, 154 (2017) (explaining the merits of judicial federalism to the decades-long
effort to win same-sex marriage battles in state courts, with the hope that the Supreme Court would
eventually take note of the trend and nationalize the right).
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APPENDIX
State Constitutional Provisions on the Right to Vote
State
Pennsylvania

State Constitutional Provisions
Art. I. § 5: “Elections shall be free and equal; and no power,
civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free
exercise of the right of suffrage.”
The Equal Protection Provisions:
Art. I, § 1: “All men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty . . .
and of pursuing their own happiness.”
Art I, § 26: Neither the Commonwealth nor any political
subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of
any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the
exercise of any civil right.”

North Carolina

Art. I, § 19: “No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to
discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or
national origin.”

Missouri

Art I, § 25: “all elections shall be free and open . . . ”
Art. I, § 2: “All persons are created equal and are entitled to
equal rights and opportunity under the law.”
Art. VIII, § 11: “A person seeking to vote in person in public
elections may be required to identify himself or herself and
verify his or her qualifications . . . by providing election
officials with a form of identification.”

Arkansas

Article III, § 1: any person in the state may vote provided
she is (1) a citizen of the United States; (2) an Arkansas
resident; (3) at least 18 years old; and (4) lawfully registered to
vote.

Indiana

Art II, § 1: “All elections shall be free and equal.”
Art II, § 2: “A citizen of the United States, who is at least 18
years of age and who has been a resident of a precinct 30 days
immediately preceding an election may vote in that precinct
at the election.”
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Art I, § 23: “The General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
Tennessee

Art. IV, § 1: Every person, being 18 years of age, being a
resident of the State . . . and being duly registered in the
county of residence . . . shall be entitled to vote in all federal,
state, and local elections held in the county or district in
which the person resides. All such requirements shall be
equal and uniform across the state, and there shall be no
other qualification attached to the right of suffrage.
The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws . . . to
secure the freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot
box . . .
Art I, § 5 “The elections shall be free and equal . . . “

Georgia

Art II, § 2: “Every person who is a citizen of the United
States and a resident of Georgia . . . who is at least 18 years
of age . . . and who meets minimum residency requirements
as provided by law shall be entitled to vote at any election by
the people. The General Assembly shall provide by law for
the registration of the electors.”
Art. I, § 1: No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws.

Oklahoma

Art. 2, § 4, art 3, § 5: provides that elections “shall be free
and equal”
Art 3, § 4: grants legislature the power to “prescribe the time
and manner of holding and conducting all elections, and
enact such laws as may be necessary to detect and punish
fraud in such elections.”

Wisconsin

Article III, § 1: Every United States citizen age 18 or older
who is a resident of an election district in this state is a
qualified elector of that district.

